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ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, INC. V. FTC-
BEYOND A "REASONABLE REMEDY"?
The authority of the Federal Trade Commission (referred to as FTC or
Commission) to require advertisers to correct misleading advertising by or-
dering disclosure of certain product information has long been recognized. 1
The United States Supreme Court's recent extension of first amendment
protection to commercial speech has brought into question the scope of the
FTC's regulatory authority in this area. 2 Although two courts of appeals
have subsequently upheld the imposition of corrective advertising orders, 3 a
more stringent type of affirmative disclosure, 4 the extent of the FTC's au-
thority remains undetermined.5 Because the Commission intends to con-
1. FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933) (company required to disclose that it only
packaged, and did not grind, flour as its name implied); National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v.
FTC., 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977) (controversy among medical experts concerning the effect of
cholesterol on health must be disclosed), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Warner-Lambert
Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (company had to disclose that its mouthwash did
not prevent colds), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978); Johnson Products Co. v. FTC, 549 F.2d
35 (7th Cir. 1977) (company required to issue warning about its hair care products); Waltham
Watch Co. v. FTC, 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.) (imported watches had to'indicate country of origin
to avoid confusion with original domestic company with the same name), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
944 (1963); Keele Scalp & Hair Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960) (limited
efficacy of treatment for baldness required to be disclosed); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC,
276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.) (limited efficacy of treatment for baldness had to be disclosed), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960); Bantam Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.) (abridged and
retitled books required to be clearly labeled as such), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960); L.
Heller & Son, Inc. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951) (foreign pearls had to be labeled as
imported). See note 9 infra.
2. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976). See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
3. In Egg Nutrition, the National Commission on Egg Nutrition was required to disclose in
future advertising that a controversy existed among medical experts over the relationship be-
tween egg consumption and heart disease. 570 F.2d at 165-67. In Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC,
562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978), Warner-Lambert was re-
quired to state in $10 million of its advertising: "Listerine will not help prevent colds or sore
throats or lessen their severity." Id. at 753.
4. The term "affirmative disclosure" refers to the correction of factual misrepresentations
inherent in advertising or labeling by requiring more complete disclosure, while the term "'cor-
rective adve'rtising" usually describes an order requiring an advertiser to make certain state-
ments to discredit claims made, or the image created by, prior advertising. The limited duration
of corrective advertising further distinguishes it from affirmative disclosure. See generally Note,
The Limits of FTC Power to Issue Consumer Protection Orders, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 496
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Limits of FTC Power]; Note, Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC: Correc-
tive Advertising Gives Listerine a Taste of its Own Medicine, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 957 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Listerine].
5. See Elman, The New Constitutional Right to Advertise, 64 A.B.A. J. 206 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Elman]. In Virginia State Board, the Court noted that "some forms of commer-
cial speech regulation are surely permissible." 425 U.S. at 770. The Court also recognized that
the difference between commercial speech and other types of speech traditionally protected by
the first amendment might "make it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in
such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary
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tinue to seek affirmative disclosure and corrective advertising remedies, 6
and because Congress desires to curb what is considered FTC "harassment"
of business, 7 the Commission's authority will no doubt continue to be fre-
quently litigated.
In Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 8 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the FTC's extension of affirmative
disclosure to remedy deceptive practices in the direct selling industry. The
order upheld by the court dictates the format and wording of future advertis-
ing and requires salespersons to clearly state the purpose of their visit to a
prospective purchaser's home. This order departs from FTC practice in that
affirmative disclosure traditionally has been imposed by the Commission
when the deception created by misleading advertising or labeling survived
the discontinuance of the unfair or deceptive practice. 9 In such cases, cease
and desist orders are often considered ineffective because they do not cor-
rect consumers' lingering reliance on advertising that may motivate sub-
sequent purchasing decisions. 10 Encyclopaedia Britannica is not, however,
to prevent its being deceptive." Id. at 771 n.24. Accord, Friedman v. Rogers, 441 U.S. 917
(1979); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
6. See [1979] 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-7. The Commission, however,
has not set forth the guidelines it will follow in invoking the corrective advertising or affirmative
disclosure remedies; rather, it will seek such remedial action on a case by case basis. Id.
7. In discussing recent congressional concern over FTC action, evidenced by the delay in
granting funds for the Commission, one author notes: "FTC chairman Michael Pertschuck . . .
last month before Senator Ford's subcommittee . . . made a number of concessions, including a
startling one that some FTC staffers now gone from the agency had conducted what amounted
to a 'vendetta' against some industries subject to FTC rules." Gordon, FTC: I Step Behind
National Mood?, Advertising Age, Oct. 29, 1979, at 3.
8. 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1329 (1980).
9. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965). Although it is difficult to
generalize, the form of an affirmative disclosure order can usually be characterized in one of
three ways. First, affirmative disclosure can correct either product labeling or advertising that
factually misrepresents the nature, content, or origin of the product, or it can correct a truthful
advertisement or label which is deceptive because of the way it might be interpreted. See, e.g.,
FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922) (labels in clothes required to show fabric
content); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960) (manufacturer of device to stop bedwetting
had to disclose its limited efficacy); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. IFC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922)
(manufacturer of baking powder required to relabel product where product content was changed
after 60 years of advertising the superiority of the original formula). See also cases cited in note
I supra. Second, affirmative disclosure can counteract years of deceptive advertising. This is
termed corrective advertising and is an admission by an advertiser that prior claims were untrue
because the advertised product cannot perform as promised. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v.
FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of
the Federal Trade Commission, 85 HARV. L. REV. 477 (1971) [hereinafter cited as "Corrective
Advertising" Orders]. Third, affirmative disclosure may publicize that a company is subject to
an FTC order as a result of engaging in unfair trade practices. See, e.g., STP Corp., [1978] 3
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,390. See generally Lemke, Souped Up Affirmative Disclosure
Orders of the F.T.C., 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 180 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Lemke].
10. See Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90
HARV. L. REV. 661, 696 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Pitofsky]; "Corrective Advertising" Orders,
supra note 9, at 484; Listerine, supra note 4, at 962-66.
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such a case because it is unlikely that direct selling practices will affect fu-
ture purchasing behavior.
This Note examines the propriety of an affirmative disclosure remedy in
the direct selling context, focusing on the authority of the Commission to
take such action without articulating the basis for its decision or demonstrat-
ing the efficacy of the remedy. In addition, it discusses the constitutionality
of the order and the economic repercussions likely to follow from the imposi-
tion of such an order on a single member of an industry. This Note proposes
that the courts take a stronger role in reviewing the legality of FTC orders
in light of the increasing impact of that agency's action. Further, it suggests
that when the need for stringent consumer protection measures is indicated,
the FTC should redress the injury through rulemaking procedures requiring
the adherence of an entire industry, rather than proceeding piecemeal
against one of several competitors. 11
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The FTC was created in 1914 by Congress' enactment of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), intended primarily to supplement existing
Profits realized by a company using a deceptive practice between issuance of a complaint and
entry of a final order have been termed "delay profits." "Corrective Advertising" Orders, supra
note 9, at 4&3. Because FTC proceedings can be protracted when vigorously contested, "delay
profits" may be substantial. Yet, profits from deceptive practices are usually unrecoverable be-
cause cease and desist orders cannot be applied retrospectively. Id. at 482-84. Affirmative dis-
closure is used, therefore, to dissipate the effect of the prior deception on subsequent profits.
Affirmative disclosure serves a deterrent function as well. The FTC recently published the
results of a study evaluating the impact of advertisements run by STP Corporation pursuant to a
consent order entered into with the Commission. STP Corp., [1978] 3 TRADE REC. REP. (CCH)
21,390. The company was required to spend $200,000 to print an advertisement entitled
"FTC NOTICE" which stated: "As a result of our investigation by the FTC into certain al-
legedly inaccurate past advertisements for STP's oil additive, STP Corp. has agreed to a
$700,000 settlement to avoid protracted litigation." The advertisement further stated that al-
though STP may have relied on inaccurate test data in claiming that users of its product realized
reduced oil consumption, the settlement was not an admission that the company had violated
the law. [1978] 851 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-9. Those surveyed to determine
the effect of the corrective advertising were aware of the problem STP had experienced, but
could not recall the advertisement itself. The survey found better recall among businessmen and
advertising executives who felt they had learned from STP's experience. [1979] 930 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-16. The main impact of the "notice" advertisements was, there-
fore, to insure the reliability of subsequent STP advertising and to warn advertisers of possible
embarrassing and costly consequences of engaging in deceptive advertising. [1978] 831 ANTs-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-10.
11. Pursuant to its rulemaking authority, Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.), the Commission has power to promulgate rules defining unfair or decep-
tive practices within the meaning of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1976) [hereinafter referred to as FTC Act].
One essential difference between adjudication and rule-making is their scope of application.
While adjudicator) proceedings bind only the company against which an order issues, trade
regulation rules are binding on all companies engaged in the conduct which the rule proscribes.
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enforcement of antitrust laws. 12 Although some early case law suggested
that the FTC had authority to regulate unfair practices injurious not only to
competitors, but also to consumers, 13 it was not until the Wheeler-Lea
Amendments in 1938 that Congress amended section 5 of the FTC Act to
grant the FTC authority to regulate practices considered unfair or deceptive
to consumers. 14 From this legislation the FTC derives its authority to regu-
late advertising and selling practices, 15 and it generally implements its
statutory mandate by ordering violators to cease and desist from engaging in
12. FTC Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914). The Act prohibited "unfair methods of
competition." Id. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see Limits of FTC Power,
supra note 4, at 505-09; Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1005, 1019-21 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
13. In FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922), the Supreme Court held that an
industry-wide practice of labeling a wool blend fabric as "all wool" was an unfair method of
competition because it misled the public, Id. at 491-93, The Court also noted, however, that
truthful competitors were affected by the misleading labeling as well. Id. at 494. In FTC v.
Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929), the Supreme Court held that the FTC could attack a company's
practice as unfair even though the company's competitors would not have a private right of
action. Id. at 25. The Court afirmeid the dismissal of the complaint, however, because the
public interest involved was neither specific nor substantial. Id. at 28. Yet, in FTC v. Raladam
Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), the Court held that "[t]he paramount aim of the act is the protection
of the public from the evils likely to result from the destruction of competition or the restriction
of it in a substantial degree, and this presupposes the existence of some substantial competition
to be affected. ... Id. at 647-48.
14. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938). The amendments extended the
FTC's authority beyond the "unfair methods of competition" proscribed by the 1914 Act to
"[u]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
15. For a thorough discussion of practices found deceptive or unfair, see Annot., 65
A.L.R.2d 225, 253-306 (1959). The determination of whether a practice is deceptive or unfair
within the meaning of § 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), is left exclusively to the
Commission, and the general language of the Act affords the Commission wide latitude in defin-
ing its parameters. The FTC can evaluate the deceptive character of an advertisement on the
basis of information in the record or within its general knowledge. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327
U.S. 608, 614 (1946). The deception can be express or implied, Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 411 F.2d
481 (7th Cir. 1969), and can result from truthful as well as false or misleading statements, e.g.,
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922). When an advertisement is suscep-
tible of more than one interpretation and when one inference is deceptive, the advertisement
will be found to violate § 5. Floersheim v. Weinburger, 346 F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1972).
The Commission need not offer objective proof of an advertisement's deceptive nature. FTC
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965). Further, courts have stated that "ad-
vertisements are not to be judged by their effect upon the scientific or legal mind . . . but
rather by their effect upon the average member of the public." Ward Laboratories, Inc. v.
FTC, 276 F.2d 952, 954 (2d Cir. 1960). This "average person" standard has, however, been
substantially diluted so that "if anyone of any intelligence level could find and believe a mislead-
ing connotation, the advertiser apparently must be prepared to defend that connotation." Gurol
& Mann, An Objective Approach to Detecting and Correcting Deceptive Advertising, 54 NoTRE
DAME LAw. 73, 75 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Gurol & Mann] (quoting Millstein, The Federal
Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439, 460 n.93 (1964)). The
Commission's initial determination of deception is, therefore, almost impervious to attack. For a
thorough discussion of the standards used by the FTC, see Developments, supra note 12, at
1039-63.
1980] ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
illegal conduct. 16 Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history
indicate congressional intent to grant the Commission remedial power
beyond cease and desist orders. 17 The judiciary has, however, interpreted
16. FTC Act, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976). For a discussion of the Commission's proce-
dures in issuing orders, see Developments, supra note 12, at 1073-85; United States v. J.B.
Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 441 (2d Cir. 1974). See also 16 C.F.R. § 2.31 (1980) (consent
orders); 16 C.F.R. § 3.46 (1980) (orders following adjudicatory proceedings); E. ROCKEFELLER,
DESK BOOK OF FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 101-09 (3d ed. 1979).
17. See Limits of FTC Power, supra note 4, at 505-11. Despite differing views of members
of the House and Senate, "[d]ebate on the final version of the trade commission bill indicated
that others of the bill's drafters did not understand the power to issue cease and desist orders to
include authority to regulate future conduct." Id. at 508-09. The legislative history of the FTC
Act also makes clear that Congress intended the Commission's power to be exercised only
prospectively and in a remedial, not a punitive, manner. Id. at 508. The Supreme Court in
United States v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952), recognized Congress' intent, stating: "Or-
ders of the FTC are not intended to impose criminal punishment or exact compensatory dam-
ages for past acts, but to prevent illegal practices in the future." Id. at 483. See also FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 726 (1948). Orders aimed at deceptive practices which have the
effect of dissipating prior profits would be retroactive and, therefore, beyond the FTC's author-
ity. Arguably, corrective statements concerning the product have just this effect. See Warner-
Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
The FTC attempted to blur this prospective-retrospective distinction in Curtis Publishing
Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472, 1512-18 (1971), stating:
Every Commission order is "retrospective" in the sense that it looks to and is based
upon the causes and results of the acts found to violate the statute, and is at the
same time "prospective" in the sense that its design, purpose, and effect is to dissi-
pate any lingering effects of the past violations and to prevent their recurrence in
the future.
Id. at 1514. Arid, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973), the Commission concluded that an order with the
purpose and effect of terminating a continuing public injury is not retrospective at all. A former
Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the FTC has further argued that the re-
quirement that orders be prospective only lacks basis in judicial or agency interpretations of
FTC authority. Pitofsky, supra note 10, at 695. Despite disagreement about what is or is not
retrospective, courts have had no difficulty in upholding affirmative disclosure and corrective
advertising orders. See cases cited in note 1 supra.
The distinction between remedial and punitive FTC orders is more difficult to ascertain. After
all, what might be punitive for remedying a minor violation of § 5, might be remedial if im-
posed on a company frequently charged with engaging in deceptive practices. Yet, the court in
All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc. v. FTC, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828
(1970), refused to modify or set aside an order "despite its severity" because the Commission
considered the order necessary to protect the public. Reaching the opposite conclusion, an
administrative law judge in Sun Oil Co., 84 F.T.C. 247 (1974), refused to order corrective
advertising, concluding that a broad order of longer duration than necessary to remedy con-
sumer injury would have been punitive.
Although recent court decisions and Commission opinions discussed above have eroded the
retrospective-prospective distinction, it remains clear that Commission orders must still serve a
remedial function. An overly broad remedy still can be modified or set aside by a reviewing
court as punitive. Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 129-30 (1962);
Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1974); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 24
(7th Cir. 1971); Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 883 (1961).
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the FTC Act as a grant of such authority. 18 Ample precedent, therefore,
supports the FTC's authority to order affirmative disclosure. 19
18. Early cases considered the extension of the Commission's authority beyond cease and
desist orders in the context of the enforcement of antitrust laws. In FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
274 U.S. 619 (1927), the Court found the Commission's authority expressly confined to that
conferred by the statute. In striking down a divestiture order against Kodak, the Supreme
Court held that the Commission had not "been delegated the authority of a court of equity." Id.
at 623. The Court adhered to this view of administrative authority in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80 (1943). There, the Court held that although Congress had granted the SEC dis-
cretionary power to regulate stockholder behavior, the Commission could not invoke general
equitable powers on a case by case basis to proscribe certain actions. Id. in 1963, the Court
changed its approach. In Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963),
the Court held that under the statute granting regulatory power to the Civil Aeronautics Board,
Congress gave the Board authority only to issue cease and desist orders. "Authority ...ample
to deal with the evil at hand" was inferred by the Court from congressional intent to enable the
board to effectively regulate the airline industry. Id. at 312. Thus, "the power to compel dives-
titure" did not have "to be explicitly included in the powers of the administrative agency to be
part of its arsenal of authority." Id. at 312 n.17.
Similarly, in FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966), the Supreme Court recognized
the power of the FTC to go beyond its statutorily conferred cease and desist authority. Finding
that Eastman Kodak had been repudiated by later cases, the Dean Foods Court affirmed the
FTC's power to seek a preliminary injunction blocking a proposed merger as a prerequisite to
the agency's effective discharge of its responsibilities. Id. at 606 n.4. This same FTC authority
was recognized by the Seventh Circuit in L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971),
where the court upheld a Commission divestiture order. The Court specifically referred to the
equitable power of the FTC in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). There,
the Court held that:
[LIegislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the Federal Trade Com-
mission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice
against the elusive, but Congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a
court of equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter
or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 244. In Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 920 (1969), the Sixth Circuit affirmed another exercise of the Commission's implied author-
ity by upholding a mandatory licensing order. The FTC also prevailed recently over a challenge
to its order limiting the dollar amount'of Arthur Murray's consumer contracts to $1500. Arthur
Murray Studios of Wash., Inc. v. FTC, 458 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972). In these cases, dealing
primarily with antitrust violations, the courts have significantly expanded the authority of the
FTC.
19. The first affirmative disclosure case was decided in 1922. Royal Baking Powder Co. v.
FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922). For over 60 years, Royal Baking Powder had advertised its
product as superior to baking powders containing phosphate. The company subsequently in-
eluded phosphate in its product and simultaneously stopped the advertising and labeling used
when the product was phosphate-free; however, the FTC required the label and advertising to
include "phosphate" in the product name. Id. at 746-49. The F'C stated that only in this way
could consumers' mistaken belief about the actual nature of the product be dispelled. Id. at
749-50.
Another early affirmative disclosure order was imposed in FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288
U.S. 212 (1933). In Royal Milling, the Commission initially issued a cease and desist order
barring use of the company's tradename. The company then sought modification of the order to
allow retention of the tradename. The company claimed that disclosure of the fact that the
company did not mill, but only packaged, flour would sufficiently eliminate the deception. The
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Courts reviewing FTC orders can affirm, modify, or set aside an order
when the Commission has abused its discretion. 20  The United States Su-
preme Court, in Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 21 held that the Commission's
Supreme Court ordered the modification as requested by Royal Milling, id. at 217, and the case
was remanded to the Commission to determine the form of the disclosure.
Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950), was the first
decision to limit the Commission's authority to order an advertiser to include negative state-
ments about its product in its advertising. The Court distinguished "the negative function of
preventing falsity and the affirmative function of requiring, or encouraging, additional interest-
ing, and perhaps useful, information which is not essential to prevent falsity," and held that
"Congress gave the Commission the power of the former but did not give it the latter." Id. at
39. Alberty did not, however, signal a trend toward limiting the FTC's power. Subsequent cases
either distinguished Alberty based upon the statute under which suit was brought, FTC Act, §
15, 15 U.S.C. 55 (1976) (concerning drug labeling), or upon the strength of the FTC's evidence
supporting the alleged deception, evidence found unpersuasive in Alberty. See Feil v. FTC, 285
F.2d 879, 898-99 (9th Cir. 1960); Keele Scalp & Hair Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18, 23
(5th Cir. 1960); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 827 (1960). See also "Corrective Advertising" Orders, supra note 9, at 489-90.
Since these early decisions, the Commission has had success in obtaining even more stringent
affirmative disclosure orders against a number of companies. In most of these cases, the decep-
tion remedied resulted from claims of product efficacy, usually reinforced by extensive advertis-
ing. While the claim itself was truthful, the product produced the claimed beneficial results
only in limited circumstances. Thus, in J.B. Williams Co., the makers of Geritol had adver-
tised the beneficial effect of an iron supplement for women who felt tired. The FTC order, af-
firmed by the Sixth Circuit, required disclosure that the great majority of people who feel tired
do not suffer from an iron deficiency. 381 F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1967). Recently, the FTC
has sought more stringent types of affirmative disclosure orders, particularly those requiring
corrective advertising. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972), aff'd, 481
F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973). One of the strongest orders to date,
entered in Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
950 (1978), required the makers of Listerine to expend $10 million to advertise that their pro-
duct was not effective as a cold remedy. Similarly, the FTC has sought, and in one case ob-
tained, consent orders against companies requiring them to disclose in subsequent advertising
that the FTC has found their prior advertising deceptive. See the discussion of the order en-
tered against STP Corporation in note 10 supra. See also Lemke, supra note 9.
20. Courts may not evaluate the "correctness" of the Commission's decision because an
administrative agency's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by the evidence. 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(c) (1976); FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937); J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC,
381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
21. 327 U.S. 608 (1946). At issue in Siegel was whether the FTC could order excision of a
tradename used by the company for its line of coats. The Commission found the tradename
deceptive because it implied that the coats were made from one fabric when in fact another was
used. The Court applied the "reasonably related" standard narrowly, holding that despite the
Commission's expertise to determine what was necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive
practice, business assets (the company's tradename) were to be afforded the full protection of
the law. This protection prevented destruction of those assets when less severe remedial mea-
sures would affect the same result. The Court remanded the case to the Commission to deter-
mine if the deception could be eliminated by modifying the tradename in some way. Id. at
612-14. Accord, FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934); FTC v. Royal Milling Co.,
288 U.S. 212 (1933); Magnaflo Co. v. FTC, 343 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Elliot Knitwear, Inc.
v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959). See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 268-69 (1965). See also "Corrective Advertising" Orders, supra note 9, at 497-99
(discussing the "standard of necessity" which evolved from the ruling in Siegel).
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exercise of discretion was to be viewed in light of its expertise in regulatory
matters, stating that "courts [should] not interfere except where the rem-
edy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to
exist." 2 2  Courts following Siegel have applied the "reasonably related"
standard, reaching varying results. 23 Although a broad reading of Siegel
suggests that courts should uphold orders that have a possibility of remedy-
ing a violation, a narrow interpretation would require that'an FTC remedy
go no further than necessary to correct a violation.24 Courts applying the
"reasonably related" standard, however, have done so in light of the great
deference traditionally accorded the Commission in fashioning remedies. 25
To enable a reviewing court to determine whether the Commission
abused its discretion in issuing an order, the FTC is required by statute to
include in its rulings a statement of its findings and conclusions, and the
basis on which they rest. 26 Some courts have held that this statute man-
dates findings and conclusions regarding the FTC's choice of a particular
remedy. 27 Other courts have found that the statute is satisfied if the rem-
edy ordered is likely to prevent recurrence of the violation. 28 The majority
22. 327 U.S. at 613.
23. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. at 473 (order which was understandable, reasonably
related to the facts, and within the Commission's discretion was affirmed); Floersheim v. FTC,
411 F.2d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 1969) (order was found reasonably calculated to end deception and
was therefore affirmed), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1002 (1970); Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC, 318
F.2d 28, 32 (7th Cir. 1963) (although court might have imposed a different remedy, where a
reasonable relationship existed between the violation and the remedy, the order had to be
approved). But cf. Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 1398, 1402 (2d Cir. 1976) (the overall
concept of reasonableness requires narrowing overbroad orders to more closely relate to pro-
scribed conduct); Arthur Murray Studio of Wash., Inc. v. FTC, 458 F.2d at 625 (order should be
no broader than reasonably necessary when it restricts lawful activity); Magnaflo Co. v. FTC,
343 F.2d at 320 (ordinary fairness required consideration of less severe remedy); Elliot Knit-
wear, Inc. v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787, 791 (2d Cir. 1959) (Commission abused its discretion in not
considering a less stringent remedy).
24. See cases cited in note 23 supra.
25. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 385; FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S.
419, 428-29 (1957); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. at 473.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976).
27. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-68 (1962) (case re-
manded because ICC failed to justify the imposition of a more burdensome remedy); Gil-
bertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. at 129-31 (case remanded because record
failed to show whether alternative remedies were considered); Papercraft Corp. v. FTC, 472
F.2d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 1973) (order modified because no showing was made that the extreme
remedy of divestiture was necessary); Magnaflo Co. v. FTC, 343 F.2d at 320-21 (case remanded
for consideration of alternative remedies other than total excision of petitioner's tradename);
Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. FTC, 266 F.2d at 791 (case remanded to Commission to determine if
modification rather than excision of tradename would eliminate deception).
28. FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 391-93 (1959) (activities related to those
found to be illegal can be prohibited as a preventive measure); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352
U.S. at 429 (to prevent recurrence of illegal practices, legal as well as illegal conduct can be
prohibited); L.G. Balfour Co..v. FTC, 442 F.2d at 23 (divestiture upheld despite other available
remedies); Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d at 343 (broad order upheld to prevent
petitioner's use of similar illegal practices in other areas of its business).
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of courts faced with this issue have adhered to the latter, holding that the
basis on which the Commission's ruling rests is the factual determination of a
violation in need of correction. 29
Since the United States Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 30 extended first amend-
ment protection to commercial speech, reviewing courts have been faced
with determining the constitutional validity of FTC orders. The Court in
Virginia State Board only briefly discussed the scope of such protection, but
was quick to point out that nothing in the ruling prevented state regulation
of false or deceptive advertising. 31 Although the full extent of first amend-
ment protection has not been determined, it is clear from courts of appeals
decisions applying Virginia State Board that the Commission's remedies,
even for deceptive advertising, can go no further than necessary to eliminate
the deception.32 What some early courts determined a "reasonable
relation" 33 -- no more stringent a remedy than was necessary to prevent the
deceptive act or practice-has now become constitutional mandate.4
29. See cases cited in note 28 supra.
30. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
31. See note 5 supra.
32. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978, 984 (D.C. Cir.
1977), aff'd, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157,
164 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611,
618-20 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977). Cf. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (remedy that goes no further than necessary is not constitutionally
required, although breadth of remedy is a basis for evaluating it), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950
(1978).
In Egg Nutrition, an association hoping to promote egg consumption advertised that there
was no scientific evidence proving that eating eggs increased cholesterol levels in the blood.
The court struck down as overbroad the part of the order requiring the association to state
affirmatively that many medical experts believed adverse health effects did result from choles-
terol. The court stated that requiring the association to publicize the other side of the con-
troversy would interfere with the advertiser's message. As modified, the order required only
disclosure of the existence of a controversy surrounding the medical effects of eating eggs. This,
in the court's opinion, adequately served the remedial purpose. 570 F.2d at 164.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reached a similar conclusion in Professional
Engineers. Although the engineers' rule prohibiting competitive fee bidding was held to violate
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), the court held that the first amendment pre-
cluded the government from requiring the association to state affirmatively that it did not con-
sider competitive fee bidding unethical, a statement contrary to its position. 555 F.2d at 984. In
Beneficial, a heavily promoted, copyrighted phrase-"instant tax refund-was ordered excised
as the only means of eliminating the deception inherent in the slogan. The court found this
remedy excessive and remanded the case to the FTC for consideration of a remedial order that
would cure the deception by use of qualifying language. The court in Beneficial recognized that
although the first amendment protection now extended to advertising is not a complete abroga-
tion of the FTC's § 5 authority to regulate advertising, it does dictate that such orders receive
greater scrutiny. 542 F.2d at 618-19.
33. See cases cited in note 27 supra.
34. See cases cited in note 32 supra. See also Elman, supra note 5, at 210. The author.
stated: "The First Amendment clearly requires the Commission to satisfy the heavy burden of
showing that this prohibition is necessary to prevent deception, that it is the least restrictive
remedy available, and that it does not unduly restrict the right to advertise truthfully." Id.
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Although an FTC order may be affirmed on review as constitutionally
valid and reasonably related, the court should further scrutinize the Com-
mission's exercise of discretion when the violator will suffer impairment of its
competitive position by complying with the order. The FTC can proceed
against companies subject to its jurisdiction either individually in an ad-
judicatory proceeding or by industry-wide rulemaking.35 Even though Su-
preme Court rulings accord great deference to the Commission when it pro-
ceeds against a single member of an industry, 36 the Commission's authority
to prohibit one firm from engaging in what may be an industry-wide practice
does not extend to the issuance of orders that would arbitrarily ruin one of
many violators. 37 Most decisions applying this standard have held that the
facts of the cases did not indicate that the Commission acted arbitrarily; 38
consequently, orders have rarely been attacked successfully on this ground.
In only one instance has a showing of competitive detriment resulted in
modification of an order to conform with the restrictions placed on a com-
petitor. 39
35. See note 11 supra.
36. FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355
U.S. 411 (1958). In Moog, the Court held that "[ilt is clearly within the special competence of
the commission to appraise the adverse effect on competition that might result from postponing
a particular order [pending 'action against others in the industry] prohibiting continued viola-
tions of the law." Id. at 413. Accord, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974);
Johnson Products Co. v. FTC, 549 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1977); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d
1 (7th Cir. 1971); Rabiner & Johnson, Inc. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1967). Contra,
Diener's, Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
37. In Universal-Rundle the Supreme Court stated: "[T]he FTC does not have unbridled
power to institute proceedings which will arbitrarily destroy one of many law violators in an
industry." 387 U.S. at 251. Accord, L.C. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971).
38. When courts fail to find that the Commission abused its discretion, the company chal-
lenging the order has usually shown that other members of the industry are engaged in similar
conduct, but has not shown their conduct to be illegal. See FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387
U.S. at 247. The Supreme Court further narrowed the use of the competitive disadvantage
challenge to FTC orders, holding in Uaicersal-Ru ndle that even a showing of widespread illegal
industry practices and of substantial financial injury to the challenging company might not be
sufficient ground to withhold enforcement. Id. at 251.
39. Diener's, Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Diener's, the petitioner, an
operator of several grocery stores, was prohibited from advertising certain prices as reduced.
Because the order was more restrictive than one entered against one of Diener's competitors,
the court modified it to allow Diener's to advertise in the same manner as the other grocery
chain. Id. at 1134. See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972). There, the
Commission itself gave a great deal of weight to possible competitive disadvantage in refusing to
order corrective advertising. Firestone had used a tradename which implied that its tires were
especially safe. Although the FTC ordered the company to cease and desist from further use of
the tradename, corrective advertising was not considered appropriate because other tire man-
ufacturers had used similar tradenarnes. Id. at 427-28. Despite its hesitancy to impose the more
severe remedy of corrective advertising against one member of an industry, the Commission's
recent approach is to proceed against companies individually in adjudicatory proceedings.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
The petitioner, Encyclopaedia Britannica, markets its product exclusively
through its direct selling network. The FTC's initial complaint against En-
cyclopaedia Britannica, issued in 1972, alleged a number of deceptive prac-
tices in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act. 40 On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, Britannica chal-
lenged only the affirmative disclosure provisions of the Commission's order
relating to its advertising and selling practices. The FTC found that Ency-
clopaedia Britannica generated names of prospective customers, "leads,"
through advertising purporting to solicit contest entries or requests for free
books. While the ads were literally true-prizes were awarded in all of the
contests and promotional publications were given away free 4 1-the FTC
found the advertisements deceptive because they failed to state that entering
the contest or requesting literature might result in a salesperson visiting the
entrant at home. The Commission also alleged that the failure of petitioner's
salespersons to disclose immediately the purpose of their visit was a decep-
tive practice. 42
The Commission, upholding the administrative law judge's findings of de-
ceptive practices, 4 3 concluded that a cease and desist order alone would not
effectively remedy the deception and, therefore, it ordered affirmative dis-
closure." All future advertising intended to generate leads was required to
contain a warning that furnishing information might result in a sales call. The
order stipulated the exact language to be used, as well as the precise format.
A card imprinted with a similar warning was required to be presented by
door-to-door salespersons when calling on a prospective purchaser. 45
In its appeal, Encyclopaedia Britannica argued that compliance with the
affirmative disclosure order would result in drastic economic consequences.
40. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,184 (1972). In addition to the selling and advertising practices challenged on appeal, the FTC
alleged that Britannica's advertisements used in recruiting sales personnel misrepresented the
nature of the employment offered, that there were abuses in the company's debt collection
practices, and that Britannica engaged in deceptive pricing practices. Encyclopaedia Britannica
denied some allegations and presented evidence that it no longer engaged in other alleged
conduct. Appeal Brief of Petitioners at 8-10, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d
964 (7th Cir. 1979).
41. Appeal Brief of Petitioners at 16.
42. The Commission found that many salespersons gained entry to a prospect's home by
soliciting the prospect's help in answering an advertising research questionnaire. Once the ques-
tionnaire was completed, the salesperson attempted to sell the prospect a set of encylopaedias.
Encyclopaedia Britannica responded by asserting that it heavily relied upon the questionnaire in
gathering market research data valuable in developing sales and marketing plans. Some former
salespersons called as witnesses by the FTC, however, remembered discarding the completed
questionnaires, not returning them to the company. Id. at 6-7.
43. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,119 (1976).
44. Id. at 20,978.
45. Id. at 20,974.
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Specifically, it contended that its sales would be seriously affected because
presenting the warning card was tantamount to informing a prospective
purchaser that a high pressure sales pitch would follow. 46  In addition, the
company asserted that it would lose qualified sales personnel who rely
primarily on commissions for compensation. For these reasons, the company
proposed less stringent disclosure vehicles, including use of regular business
cards rather than 3 x 5 cards with the stipulated language, but the Commis-
sion rejected these proposals without explanation. 47
THE APPELLATE DECISION
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
Encyclopaedia Britannica challenged the FTC order primarily on four
grounds: the authority of the Commission to impose a broad remedy when
less stringent measures were available; the filure of the record to state the
Commission's findings regarding the necessity or efficacy of the selected
remedy;4 8 the constitutionality of the order under the first amendment right
46. In preliminary tests conducted by Encyclopaedia Britannica, use of the prescribed lan-
guage in advertising resulted in a 50% decline in the number of people responding. Appeal
Brief for Petitioners at 52.
47. 605 F.2d at 971.
48. Encyclopaedia Britannica attacked the sufficiency of the record on another ground. It
alleged that the Commission's case was based in part on an FTC internal memorandum entitled
Analytical Program Guide for the Direct Selling Industry (APG). Id. at 974. Britannica con-
tended that the Commission relied on this study in bringing suit and that it was denied the
opportunity to rebut information about the direct selling industry contained in the study. Id. at
974-75.
In a collateral action, Britannica sought an injunction to stay the Commission's proceeding
pending the outcome of a suit seeking to obtain disclosure of the APG under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The injunction was denied, Encyclopaedia
Britannica Inc. v. FTC, 517 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1975), and the FTC prevailed initially on the
merits in the FOIA suit. Britannica sought remand to the Commission of the affirmative disclo-
sure suit pending final determination of the FOIA suit, currently on appeal to the Seventh
Circuit.
The court, in refusing to remand the case, held that petitioners had failed to show that either
the Commission or the administrative law judge were influenced in their decisions by any of the
unreleased material. This finding was based on the opinion of the district court in the initial
disclosure suit as well as the court of appeals' own evaluation of the disclosed material and
summaries thereof. After an in camera inspection of the documents, the district court stated:
"We have compared the contents of the APG with the allegations found in the Commission's
complaint ... and find them to be substantially dissimilar. . . .[T]hese seventeen documents
do not contain private transmittals of binding Commission opinions or legal interpretations
which in any fashion constitute secret agency law.'" 605 F.2d at 976. The court also cited United
States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926), and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC,
467 F.2d 67, 79 (10th Cir. 1972) (because the FTC is required to perform certain public interest
functions and is exposed to conceivably prejudicial influences, it must scrupulously focus on the
issues of a case and avoid policy concerns), for the presumption of regularity surrounding the
actions of public officials performed in their official capacities. 605 F.2d at 976. In Chemical
Foundation, however, the presumption was raised in the contekt of the propriety of action taken
by an official appointed by the executive during wartime regarding the administration of aliens'
property. 272 U.S. at 4-8. The Court in Chemical Foundation was not concerned with adminis-
trative agency action.
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to advertise; and the Commission's abuse of discretion in proceeding only
against Encyclopaedia Britannica, and not against the industry as a whole. a
The court of appeals rejected all of these arguments and affirmed the order.
The Seventh Circuit looked to the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC50 for the standard used to evaluate the Commis-
sion's exercise of authority. The Siegel "reasonable relation" test requires
that the remedy be related to the violation; if the requisite nexus is absent,
the order will be set aside. Encyclopaedia Britannica urged the court to
apply the "reasonable relation" test narrowly, as the Siegel court had
done. 51 The court of appeals recognized its authority to modify overbroad
orders where the prohibited conduct had not been found violative of section
5, 52 and cited cases requiring Commission orders to be no broader than
necessary to eliminate deception. 53 The majority found more persuasive,
however, cases holding that the Commission's authority to prohibit conduct
extends beyond practices expressly found unlawful, to include all action that
The court in Encyclopaedia Britannica accepted the Commission's assurance that it had based
its determination solely on the record in the case. 605 F.2d at 976. All parties to an administra-
tive action are, however, entitled to have evidence relied on by an agency included in the
record, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976). This is a particularly important consideration because the
prosecutor, hearing officer, and reviewing body are all agency personnel who may have had
access to the unreleased documents. See Elman, Administrative Reforhi of the Federal Trade
Commission, 59 GEO. L.J. 777, 809-10 (1971).
49. Encyclopaedia Britannica alleged that the Commission had abused its discretion in two
ways. First, that the FTC arbitrarily singled out Britannica for discriminatory treatment, and,
second, that Britannica's petition for rulemaking had been unjustifiably refused. 605 F.2d at
973. These allegations are, in essence, identical, because both question the propriety of the
Commission's exercise of discretion.
50. 327 U.S. 608 (1946). See note 21 supra.
51. See note 21 supra.
52. 605 F.2d at 970 (citing FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965); FTC v.
National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952)).
In Ruberoid, the Commission ordered the company to cease and desist from discriminatory
pricing activity. Read literally, the order would have prevented Ruberoid from engaging in any
price differentiation, even when justified by varying freight charges or meeting competitors'
prices. The Court held that the Commission clearly did not intend its order to bar pricing
practices not in violation of antitrust laws. The Court refused, however, to narrow the order to
specifically reflect this conclusion because that would have enabled the violator to achieve the
same result through slightly different, but legal, conduct. 343 U.S. at 473.
In National Lead, a case factually similar to Ruberoid, the Court expressly held that lawful
conduct could be prohibited to prevent a recurrence of past illegal activities. 352 U.S. at 430.
In Colgate-Palmolive, the Court refused to modify an order prohibiting deceptive simulated
demonstrations of any Colgate products' effectiveness in television advertising. Since the decep-
tive techniques could have been adapted to any of Colgate's advertised products, the likelihood
that a narrow order would have been circumvented was believed to be great. 380 U.S. at 395.
53. Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115 (1962); FTC v. Royal Milling
Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933); National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977);
IT-Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC,
442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971).
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would allow a violator to circumvent an order. 54 In particular, the Seventh
Circuit relied upon FTC v. National Lead Co., 5 5 which stated that a com-
pany found to have violated the Act "must expect some fencing-in." 56 Find-
ing a reasonable relationship between the violation and the remedy based on
a broad construction of the Commission's remedial power, the Encyclopaedia
Britannica court held that the FTC's choice of a remedy was well within its
discretion.
In addition, the court rejected Encyclopaedia Britannica's challenge that
the record was insufficient because it failed to show the efficacy of, or neces-
sity for, the remedy. 57 The court accepted the Commission's finding that
"clear and conspicuous disclosure" was needed to eliminate the deception,
and held that such disclosure did "not unduly interfere with Encyclopaedia
Britannica's business operations." 5 8  The court also found the record to
clearly imply that the FTC had considered remedial alternatives, but had
rejected them as not effective. According to the majority, implied considera-
tion of the alternatives sufficed-the statutory standard did not mandate an
express comparison between the remedy imposed by the FTC and those
suggested by the petitioner. 59 The majority rejected the petitioner's con-
tention that the Supreme Court holding in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 60 requiring reversal of a remedial order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) for that agency's failure to justify its choice of
remedies, dictated a similar result in Encyclopaedia Britannica. By distin-
guishing Burlington Truck Lines on the basis of the remedial choices
involved in that case, 61 and by finding that the Commission impliedly con-
sidered the alternatives available in Encyclopaedia Britannica, the court
refused to invalidate or remand the order.
Encyclopaedia Britannica further attacked the affrmative disclosure order
as violative of its first amendment right to advertise. To determine the con-
stitutionality of the FTC's order, the court examined the Supreme Court's
ruling in Virginia State Board of Pharnacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
54. See note 52 supra.
55. 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
56. Id. at 431.
57. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
58. 605 F.2d at 971.
59. Id.
60. 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
61. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), in Burlington Truck Lines, was faced with
alleviating disruptions in trucking service resulting from labor problems between union and
non-union carriers. Some union carriers had refused to provide connecting service for non-union
trucking companies in areas where the non-union truckers were not certified to run. Rather
than order the union truckers to cease and desist from refusing to haul freight for the non-union
companies, the ICC granted new certification to the non-union truckers, thereby allowing them
to run their trucks on what had been exclusively union routes. Id. at 163. The Supreme Court
found the difference between a cease and desist order and new certification so great that the
ICC's failure to articulate its reasons for choosing the more drastic of the two remedies required
reversal of the order. It also rejected the ICC's argument that the cease and desist order would
have been ineffective under the circumstances. Id. at 168.
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Council, 62 extending limited first amendment protection to commercial
speech. 63 The court followed the literal holding of Virginia State Board
that only truthful commercial speech is constitutionally protected. The court
then examined lower court decisions, including a Seventh Circuit decision,6 4
which held that a remedy, even for deceptive advertising, could extend no
further than necessary to eliminate deception. 65 The court distinguished
these cases on their facts by either the type of speech protected 66 or the
content of the affirmative disclosure required. 67 Further, the court con-
cluded that it was unable to determine that the order was not the least
restrictive remedy available in light of the practices alleged, and held that
the affirmative disclosure order did not infringe on petitioner's first amend-
ment rights.
Encyclopaedia Britannica based its final challenge to the affirmative disclo-
sure order on the ground that the Commission had abused its discretion by
proceeding against one member of an industry to Britannica's substantial
competitive detriment. 68 Britannica contended that the Commission should
have sought to restrict Encyclopaedia Britannica's competitors similarly
through its rulemaking procedure. 69 The court, however, looked to the
strong precedent according deference to the Commission's discretion in this
area, 70 even when it proceeds against only one member of an industry. 71
Although the court in Encyclopaedia Britannica recognized that the Com-
mission would abuse its discretion if it treated one violator differently from
another, 72 the court did not feel that Britannica had been subjected to dis-
crimination. The court then looked to similar orders entered against P.F.
Collier & Son Corporation 7 3 and Grolier, Incorporated, 7 4 competitors of
62. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
63. See note 5 supra.
64. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 821 (1978); United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), aff'd, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
65. See note 32 supra
66. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976) (a copyrighted phrase).
67. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977) (original order
would have required discussion of medical opinions of the dangers of eating eggs); United States
v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (order originally re-
quired society to state that fee bidding was not ethical, a position it did not hold).
68. See notes 36-38 supra.
69. See note 11 supra.
70. 605 F.2d at 974 (citing Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958)).
71. See cases cited in note 36 supra.
72. 605 F.2d at 974 (citing Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 414 (1958) and L.G.
Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 24 (7th Cir. 1971)).
73. P. F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1970). In Collier, the order
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit required door-to-door salespersons to disclose verbally the nature
of their visit. Although the company was charged with engaging in practices similar to those of
Encyclopaedia Britannica, no written disclosure was required. The majority in Encyclopaedia
Britannica accorded little significance to the less burdensome Collier order since that order was
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Britannica. Citing these two orders, the court was unable to find that Ency-
clopaedia Britannica would be placed at a competitive disadvantage.
CRITICISM
One weakness in the Encyclopaedia Britannica decision hinges on the
court's broad interpretation of the "reasonable relation" test set out in Jacob
Siegel Co. v. FTC;75 that the Commission's orders should be affirmed if
reasonably related to preventing future illegal conduct. 76 The court in En-
cyclopaedia Britannica chose to follow the cases applying Siegel which have
allowed the Commission to prohibit conduct beyond that expressly found
unlawful in order to ensure the order's effectiveness. 77 The court's reliance
on this line of cases was, however, misplaced. These cases primarily in-
volved antitrust violations which might have continued in some other form
absent a broad prohibitory order. 78 Courts reviewing trade cases in which
substantial business assets were at stake have taken a narrower view of what
is a reasonably related remedy. 79 Moreover, in two recent opinions, the
Seventh Circuit narrowed orders that went further than reasonably necessary
to end the violations. 80 The court in Encyclopaedia Britannica failed, how-
ever, to explain its departure from these narrow readings of the Siegel stan-
dard. Justice Wood, dissenting, concluded that the remedy exceeded the
limits of the "reasonably related" standard, and was, therefore, punitive. 81
In addition, he cited the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Papercraft Corp. v.
FTC, 8 2 striking down an FTC divestiture order because the Commission had
failed to show the need for such an "exceptional remedy." Yet, in Ency-
clopaedia Britannica, the court affirmed the order despite the Commission's
failure to show the necessity for, or greater efficacy of, the affirmative disclo-
sure requirements. 83
Another criticism of Encyclopaedia Britannica stems from its analysis of
the adequacy of Commission's record. The court, -after reviewing the Com-
mission's finding of the studied character of the deception and its conclusion
that "clear and conspicuous disclosure" was required to eliminate the decep-
entered almost 10 years prior to Encyclopaedia Britannica, and was not considered by the FT'C
to be sufficiently effective. 605 F.2d at 974.
74. In re Grolier, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 315 (1978), remanded to the FTC on other grounds,
[1980] 1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 63,153 (9th Cir. 1980).
75. 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
76. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
77. See cases cited in note 52 supra.
78. id.
79. See cases cited in note 23 supra.
80. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 821 (1978); Papercraft Corp. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1973).
81. 605 F.2d at 977.
82. 472 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1973).
83. See Gurol & Mann, supra note 15, at 91-96 (proposing objective approach to evaluating
the efficacy of a remedy).
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tion, held that the record was sufficient in setting forth the basis for the
agency's decision. 84 The court interpreted the controlling statute as requir-
ing only a showing of the need for remedial action, rather than for the par-
ticular remedy chosen. This interpretation, however, seems contrary to the
holdings of Papercraft 85 and Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States 86
that an agency must articulate its reasons for taking particular remedial ac-
tion. Affirming the Commission's broad and burdensome order without
notice of the reasons for such an order contravenes both the statutory and
judicial standards. 87 Although the Commission cannot be expected to give
reasons for or against every conceivable remedial choice,"" in light of the
statutory requirements, 89 prior case law, 90 and the economic interests at
stake in Encyclopaedia Britannica,9 1 the court erred in failing to require the
Commission to state why the less burdensome alternatives suggested by
Britannica were unsuitable. 92 Without knowing the rationale for the rem-
edy imposed, the court could not correctly judge the Commission's exercise
of authority pursuant to the statute.
The court in Encyclopaedia Britannica erred further in concluding that
the affirmative disclosure order did not infringe upon petitioner's first
amendment rights. 93 In refusing to extend first amendment protection to
Encyclopaedia Britannica's advertisements, the court distinguished the
commercial speech which had been protected in Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 94
National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 95 and United States v. National
Society of Professional Engineers. 96 The court's distinctions were, however,
84. 605 F.2d at 971.
85. 472 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1973).
86. 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
87. The Court in Burlington Truck Lines recognized the danger inherent in agency action
unaccompanied by disclosure of reasoning, stating "[e]xpert discretion is the lifeblood of the
administrative process, but unless we make the requirements for administrative action strict and
demanding, expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster which rules
with no practical limits 'on its discretion.' " 371 U.S. at 167 (quoting New York v. United
States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)).
88. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. at 167-68; Papercraft Corp.
v. FTC, 472 F.2d at 933. Counsel for the Commission argued that if the Commission had to
justify its reasons for rejecting every possible available alternative (for example, why 3 x 5
instead of 3 x 4 cards were required), too great a burden would be imposed upon the FTC;
therefore, the argument continued, only the practices being addressed by the remedial relief
and not the various remedial choices need be articulated. Brief for Respondents at 33, Ency-
clopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976).
90. See note 27 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 46 & 47 supra.
92. See cases cited in note 27 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 62 & 63 supra.
94. 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976).
95. 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
96. 555 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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artificial. First amendment protection should not hinge on the extent to
which the affirmative disclosure order dictates the expression of a view con-
trary to that of the speaker, as was the case in Professional Engineers. 97  Nor
should the court have considered the copyrighted phrase in Beneficial to be
economically more significant than the interests at stake in Encyclopaedia
Britannica. The content of the speech at issue in Beneficial, Egg Nutrition,
and Professional Engineers was not determinative of first amendment protec-
tion; the courts in those cases held, rather, that the first amendment re-
quired a remedy no broader than necessary to eliminate the deception. 9
The court's statement that it was unable to determine that the order was
not the least restrictive in light of practices alleged 99 ignores the fact that
less drastic alternatives were proposed but rejected without explanation. 100
As the dissent noted, the affirmative disclosure order requiring specific
wording, type size and format is too harsh a remedy to be seriously consid-
ered the least restrictive. 101 By failing to review more stringently the
Commission's order to determine if it was broader than necessary, the
Seventh Circuit has abrogated Britannica's first amendment protection and
has imposed a chilling effect on commercial speech not anticipated by the
Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. 102
The Seventh Circuit should have examined the FTC's order in light of the
Supreme Court's reasoning in according commercial speech only limited pro-
tection. Virginia State Board distinguished commercial speech by its harsh-
ness, calculated nature, and relative ease of verification from other types of
speech traditionally protected by the first amendment. These unique charac-
teristics make some regulation appropriate, the Court stated, because it is
unlikely that commercial speech will be chilled or "foregone entirely." 103
Yet, the ruling in Encyclopaedia Britannica could effect either result. 104 If
97. See generally Elman, supra note 5. See also note 34 supra.
98. See Elman, supra note 5, at 210.
99. 605 F.2d at 973.
100. Because the selling practices in question do not give rise to false beliefs on the part of
the product's purchaser which linger after the practices in question have been terminated, a
cease and desist order coupled with some type of affirmative disclosure in advertising would
have sufficed to eliminate any inherent deception. But cf. Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (noting that the remedial suggestions of the violator should be given little considera-
tion).
101. Justice Wood stated: "The Commission surely has more compelling responsibilities than
to dictate the size, wording, and printer's type to be used inflexibly by the company.-' 605 F.2d
at 977 (Wood, J., dissenting).
102. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
103. Id. at 771.
104. American Home Products Corp., the maker of Anacin, has been ordered by the FTC to
spend $24 million in advertising stating that "Anacin is not a tension reliever." American Home
Products Corp., [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TitADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,465 (1978). The
company recently stated that such advertising could be ruinous in light of the competitive na-
ture of the pain-reliever market and indicated it might stop advertising entirely if the order is
subsequently affirmed. Giges, Anacin May Stop Ads Rather Than Run Correctives, Advertising
Age, Nov. 5, 1979, at 1.
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advertisements containing the affirmative disclosure prove detrimental to its
marketing efforts, the company might stop advertising altogether. For the
same reason, Encyclopaedia Britannica might seek alternative distribution
channels to circumvent the card-at-the-door requirement. Had the court of
appeals looked beyond the Supreme Court's statement that some regulation
of commercial speech is appropriate, it could not have condoned the inher-
ent chilling effect of the extensive remedial order entered in Encyclopaedia
Britannica. Modification of the order would have rendered it constitutionally
valid and consistent with the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Egg Nutri-
tion requiring an order to be no broader than necessary to eliminate decep-
tion. 105
A further weakness of Encyclopaedia Britannica stems from the court's
approval of the FTC's decision to proceed against Britannica individually.
Although the court followed strong precedent in deferring to the Commis-
sion's discretion to enter an order against a single member of an industry,
the court should not have affirmed the action of the Commission without
evaluating the devastating economic impact the FTC order might have. 10 6
If the economic impact had been considered, the court would have found
that the FTC had acted arbitrarily. 107 Although the commission has pro-
ceeded against two competitors of Britannica, seeking to impose on one a
similar order and enforcing against the other a less stringent order, a
number of Britannica's competitors remain free to engage in the practices
the Commission found deceptive. 108 Moreover, had the Commission pro-
ceeded against the industry as a whole, the ultimate beneficiary of the FTC's
action, the consumer, would have been better protected from the allegedly
unlawful selling practices. Although ideally the Commission should have
proceeded against the entire industry through its rulemaking authority, in
light of strong precedent counseling deference to the Commission's discre-
tion, the prudent course would have been for the court to have modified the
order. The imposition of an effective but less stringent remedy would have
not only lessened the economic impact of the order but would have con-
formed it to statutory and first amendment requirements.
IMPACT OF ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
The ruling in this case has far reaching implications for businesses subject
to the FTC's jurisdiction, particularly those ordered to make affirmative dis-
closures. The decision allows the Commission to impose strong remedial
105. 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
106. If the economic consequences of complying with a Commission order threaten the con-
tinued existence of the company subject to the order, the Commission, in imposing such a
remedy, is acting contrary to its mandate to protect competition as well as consumers.
107. See cases cited in notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
108. See notes 73 & 74 supra. The record of prior FTC action taken against publishing com-
panies engaged in direct selling amply demonstrates the magnitude of the problem. Prior to
1968, 41 orders were entered against 37 different companies. American Marketing Associates,
Inc., 73 F.T.C. 213, 224-25 (1968).
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measures without demonstrating the necessity for, or efficacy of, such action.
If Encyclopaedia Britannica signals a trend, businesses subject to Commis-
sion orders will have little chance of obtaining economically feasible remedial
solutions. More importantly, the Commission's readiness to invoke affirma-
tive disclosure coupled with the court's willingness to uphold such sanctions
indicate a regulatory environment increasingly hostile to adopting the least
restrictive remedy or to considering the economic consequences involved.
That an order can be affirmed without any analysis of the potentially disas-
trous economic results of compliance is perhaps the most significant aspect of
the court's ruling. 109
In addition, the court's decision has further refined the constitutional pro-
tection afforded commercial speech. 110 The standard established in previ-
ous cases provides that a remedy, even for misleading advertising, may go
no further than necessary in correcting the deception. Apparently, in the
Seventh Circuit this constitutional standard will be applied only under lim-
ited factual circumstances. The possibility that future orders will dictate for-
mat and wording difficult to adapt to standard business practices is greatly
enhanced. Although this may arguably increase the efficacy of the particular
remedy imposed, companies may hesitate to advertise to avoid the conse-
quences of running -afoul of the FTC. Thus, as a result of the court's ap-
proval of the FTC's action, there is an increased likelihood that commercial
speech protected by the first amendment will be chilled.
CONCLUSION
Encyclopaedia Britannica has extended the affirmative disclosure remedy
to a situation totally unsuited to this type of corrective action. In the context
of direct selling, the consumers affected by the allegedly deceptive practices
are unlikely to be subject to any continuing misrepresentation. Thus, an
order simply requiring Encyclopaedia Britannica to cease and desist from the
practices in question would have been effective in eliminating the deception.
Instead, the court upheld affirmative disclosure provisions which are particu-
larly harsh and burdensome, and which closely resemble corrective advertis-
ing because the required advertising and warning card will convey a nega-
tive connotation.
Further, the FTC has imposed, and the court has upheld, a sanction on a
single member of an industry which is not only severe when viewed indi-
vidually, but ruinous when viewed in a competitive setting. In affirming the
FTC, the court deferred to the discretion of the Commission on every issue
raised. While courts often give great weight to the expertise of the Commis-
sion in determining what practices are deceptive or unfair, and in fashioning
remedies, the reviewing function of a court cannot be undertaken in a vac-
uum. The economic and competitive interests at stake can only be assured
109. See Gurol & Mann, supra note 15.
110. See Elman, supra note 5. Cf Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979).
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adequate protection when the reasonable relation test and constitutional
safeguards are applied to insure that remedial orders go no further than
necessary to correct the alleged violation. Reviewing courts should not hesi-
tate to modify or remand to the Commission orders that are excessive in
achieving the desired effect. At the very least, courts should carefully
scrutinize the record relied on by the Commission before allowing such or-
ders to stand. The courts need not expand their authority to assume a more
vigilant posture; they need only look to a substantial body of case law and to
the first amendment. In short, the court erred in refusing to modify the
challenged order and in so doing has raised serious doubt as to the ability of
future petitioners to safeguard viable business interests.
Anne S. Jordan

